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Innovation is a process belonging to strategic organisation
management. A new interpretation of the process from a systemic
perspective and its holistic view (enlarging it to marketing and
organisation) has made clear the need for new definitions of
innovation and measuring patterns. This shall allow to set an end
to the classic linear conception of innovation as a thoroughly
technological process and to progress firmly towards the creation
of a systemic model for the phenomenon and a related system
of indicators.
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ropean countries and regions. It is without any
doubt on the agenda of discussions on models of
competitiveness all over the continent. But how
comes this sudden break-in of the innovation
concept to the collective mindset of decision-tak-
ers of competitiveness policies, business school
teachers, entrepreneurs, social partners, academi-
cians and scientists? What is the consensus on
the meaning and importance of the term innova-
tion? What is, after all, innovation and how is it
measured?
Europe has not been able yet to
successfully take on the challenge of
this new economic paradigm, with the
one or other notable exception in
Scandinavia.
From a management perspective we can state
that innovation is part of strategic leadership of
organisations. Out of a position of strategic
thought, innovation is a mechanism of strategic
differentiation. To put it simple, we could say, ac-
cording to Michael Porter, the leader of the pow-
erful school of strategic positioning at Harvard
Business School, that there are two basic ways of
succeeding in the markets: either I do the same
as my competitors while being able to sell
cheaper or I do things differently and get a mar-
gin for this difference.
In Catalonia we have been competing in aggre-
gated terms along the first proposal – cost com-
petition – over almost the whole second half of
the 20th century. We were able to produce and
offer undifferentiated basic products and servic-
es, basically because the local cost structure was
economical compared to our neighbouring coun-
tries.
However, with quick convergence with fellow
European countries beginning in the mid-1980s
and the appearance of powerful emergent
economies able to manufacture at a low cost, our
country suddenly lost the competitive advan-
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The concept of innovation
from a strategic 
perspective
Almost a century has passed since the Austrian
economist, Joseph Schumpeter, described in his
work Theory of Economic Development the concept
of innovation as a key factor in the setup of mod-
ern economics, with his famous theory on «waves
of creative destruction». Just over twenty years
ago, the father of modern management (theory
and practice of business management as a social
science), fellow Austrian Peter Drucker, asserted
that the United States had fully entered an econ-
omy of innovation and entrepreneurship as he
stated the unheard creation of 35 million net jobs
within only two decades spurred by the unstop-
pable forces of technological change and the
opening of markets. However, Europe apparently
has not been able yet to successfully take on the
challenge of this new economic paradigm, with
the one or other notable exception.
Innovation is doubtless a part of the 21st century
value portfolio. The European Commission pro-
posed on the 2000 Lisbon summit to «turn the
European area into the most competitive knowl-
edge-based economy of the world by 2010». In
Lisbon the recommendation was made to deploy
public policies aimed at creating regional systems
of innovation, a region being a unit of analysis re-
garding industrial and technology policy, thus be-
coming an ideal setting based on cultural homo-
geneity, common views, settled skills, networks of
personal relations and trust as well as easy cross-
connections between the different economic, sci-
entific and social stakeholders based on geo-
graphical closeness. Eight years after the Lisbon
declaration we can state, however, that the goal
will not be met. Especially Catalonia has a big
challenge ahead due to the heterogeneity of its
economic structure.
Innovation is on the priority agenda of economic,
technological and industrial policies of most Eu-
tages that had made possible to develop most of
its industrial base and attract foreign investment
over decades. We must not forget that within the
brief lapse of five years, half the world population
– China and India – has become a fearful com-
petitor of our companies as it fully entered inter-
nationalised market economy.
This leaves us with the second and only option
of competitive strategy: differentiation. It is be-
coming more and more obvious that the best
way to compete on sophisticated, dynamic and
turbulent markets with surplus offer is precisely
to get away from competition and create a unique,
exclusive and, as far as possible, unmatchable of-
fer (in products, services or both). If I am the only
producer, I then will have a temporary monopoly.
And here lies precisely the very essence of inno-
vation: to do something different from what I
used to, from what my industry or any competi-
tor does – to differentiate myself I need to intro-
duce new things. So I need to innovate. Therefore,
if I want to keep a competitive position based on
differentiation, I need to be able to innovate. And
since I may be emulated, if I want to keep a per-
manent position of differentiation, I need to be
able to permanently innovate.
In fact, if I want to avoid that my products get
lost in an undifferentiated mass of equal prod-
ucts, I need to be able to create and communi-
cate these differentiated elements. And I only
will be able to build up systematically and scien-
tifically a business if I am able to define my dif-
ferentiation strategy. For instance, if I am a man-
ufacturer of dairy products and wish to launch a
new product, I will not develop, produce and sell,
for instance, a natural yoghurt as the market is
crowded with such products and the potential
consumer will therefore have no decisive ele-
ments to choose my offer unless it is cheaper.
With equal products in a situation of exceeding
offer, my market share will tend to zero.
However, I will be able to differentiate myself if I
decide to specialise and develop, let us say, a yo-
ghurt with specific nutrients for pregnant
women. This is the only way to bring together
the needs of the market (a new market niche not
covered by the yoghurt segment) and R&D ef-
forts (which will of course require a reliable ex-
planation of the benefits for the sound develop-
ment of the foetus during pregnancy).
Only if the differentiation strategy is clear will I
be able to do a cost-benefit analysis of the proj-
ect to develop this new product since I will be
able to assess the potential market (on the
Spanish market we can estimate that there are,
for instance, one million pregnant women), my
target market (e.g. Catalonia, 150,000 pregnant
women), my sales target (e.g. two yoghurts per
week per pregnant woman, 16 million units in
the first year) – in short, to assess the operative,
communicative and financial needs of the pro-
posal. I will be able to plan the whole innova-
tion project. I therefore will be further able to
set up the business plan as all its structure
will depend on the differentiation strategy
I choose.
The best way to compete is
differentiation: getting away from
competition, creating a unique,
exclusive and, as far as possible,
unmatchable offer.
The innovation project (introducing a new prod-
uct) thus acts upon a need for strategic differen-
tiation. Differentiation is the final proposal while
innovation is the process that leads to this pro-
posal.
If the project is successful and sales rocket, new
competitors will unavoidably come up attracted
by the source of value we have unveiled. This is
the dramatic cycle of innovation: first comes in-
vention (in our example, the development of a yo-
ghurt with beneficial properties for pregnant
women), then innovation as such (successful ex-
ploitation of this invention on the market) and fi-
nally imitation by some competitors or new play-
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ers in the business. Once another competitor en-
ters the market, it usually will not be attractive
anymore due to starting price erosion. We there-
fore need to either quickly restart the innovation
cycle or set up immediately barriers to accession
mainly by:
 Creating a strong brand that conveys emotional
values (and thus induces to buy not only the
product as such but also these associated values).
 Generating experience curves (massive invest-
ment in new R&D waves and process improve-
ment that gives us explicit and tacit knowledge of
the product and the process so as to render un-
feasible the access of a new competitor).
 Protecting intellectual and industrial property.
In this context, patents are temporary legislative
concessions of a monopoly. The fact of having a
unique, exclusive and legally protected knowl-
edge of an industrial process or product gives us
de facto a monopoly on it. Nobody else is able to
manufacture it, so the law guarantees the return
on investment for the innovation, protecting it
from potential imitators.
Patents are temporary legislative
concessions of a monopoly. The fact
of having a unique, exclusive and
legally protected knowledge of an
industrial process or product gives us
de facto a monopoly on it.
If the creation of a solid legal framework to pro-
tect industrial property around 1600 paved the
way for the first industrial revolution in England
in the 17th century, the fact that knowledge-
based innovation – that is, technological innova-
tion – creates most barriers to access – which,
by the way, could be legally protected by means
of patents – is the key element that made this
innovation type clearly predominant in econom-




Technological innovation has definitely been the
focal point of trends to foster innovation in the
last years. This is partly due to the fact that it is
the kind of innovation that may provide most
clearly barriers to access – owning pragmatic
knowledge, i.e. technology, a set of unique skills
to serve the needs of a market – while creating an
excellent competitive position, especially if the
technology is legally protected.
The quest for technological innovation is partly
due to the progressive – and by now urgent –
need for approaching universities and business.
If knowledge and technology are able to create
competitive advantages with strong barriers to
access, then the great sources of knowledge of
the Western world, i.e. universities, also need to
be great sources of competitive business advan-
tages. The possibility of converting into market
value – and thus social welfare – the immense
fields of knowledge opening up permanently at
universities, thus taking advantage of the vast ex-
penditure on university research by public ad-
ministration, has been in recent times the corner-
stone of the planners of competitiveness policies.
This proposal has been applied with consider-
able success in the United States, where univer-
sities and companies are part of a systemic
whole, especially in some hi-tech settings or
clusters, such as Silicon Valley in California and
Route 128 in Massachusetts, where the interac-
tions and the rotation of staff between compa-
nies and university has been constant and gen-
erated a very strong economic growth based on
technological innovation.
This phenomenon builds on a business culture,
the creation of social role models based on young
PhD graduates becoming successful entrepre-
neurs and funding new generations of technolog-
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ical companies, a flexible labour setting, a tax sys-
tem that encourages innovation and externalities
based on hi-tech projects funded by the US De-
partment of Defense.
The great sources of knowledge of the
Western world, i.e. universities, also
need to be great sources of
competitive business advantages.
Generally speaking, proposals to create systems
of science-technology-business (in fact, systems of
technological innovation) in Europe have gone
through different steps:1 the building of national
science schemes in a first stage (1980s), the
awareness of the European gap or the European
paradox of having achieved internationally rele-
vant scientific production but inefficient when
converting the newly acquired knowledge into
business competitiveness (the United Kingdom
used to be the paradigm of a country producing
Nobel Prize laureates but suffering deep indus-
trial crises), the later proliferation of intermedi-
ary bodies between universities and companies
(technology centres in the 1990s), only to end
up (2000s) in a systemic view on innovation as
opposed to the classic – and oversimplified –
linear view on generating technology (inven-
tion) and later business.
This view on innovation as a process that needs
an ecosystem to develop merges with Michael
Porter’s proposals of competitive dynamics and
his famous theory of clusters (geographical con-
centrations of companies, specialised suppliers
and related players operating on a same eco-
nomic field). An environment with plenty of
knowledge sources (universities, technology
centres) is not enough anymore. Conditions
based on factors (skilled labour supply, spe-
cialised suppliers, managerial experience) and
demand (demanding markets nearby, generat-
ing leading users who anticipate the future), ri-
valry (creating competition and labour rotation,
generating an imitation effect with competitors
and dragging suppliers), related players (collat-
eral financial and legal markets), supporting in-
frastructure (approval and testing centres) and
appropriate industrial structure (neither inter-
vened nor monopolistic markets) become nec-
essary, and so does a reliable legislative and le-
gal setting. Innovation-based economic growth
according to Porter is not generated only by ac-
tivating some of these levers but also through
achieving an optimal balance in the cluster – a
fertile ecosystem – and creating a relational net-
work based on trust, which allows the evolution
of the cluster as a true system where the action
of one player affects all. Innovation then be-
comes almost a social process in which multi-
disciplinarity, contact networks and the associa-
tion of ideas are the true drivers for economic
development.
This view on innovation as a process
that needs an ecosystem to develop
merges with Michael Porter’s
proposals of competitive dynamics
and his famous theory of clusters.
Consequently, phenomena like Silicon Valley are
not only due to the decisive presence of the Uni-
versity of Stanford with all its unquestionable sci-
entific production, but there are other facts that
have contributed altogether to create an incredi-
bly fertile ecosystem for developing semiconduc-
tor technology: the university’s mixed focus on
business and engineering, the business footprint
set by one of its first deans, Frederick Terman, the
progressive forging of success stories (Hewlett
Packard, AMD, Apple and Intel) and the cos-
mopolitanism and good weather of San Francisco
Bay (attracting international talent).
The exchange of information and best practices
in the pubs of Mountain View and Palo Alto, the
demand for transforming projects by leading
users such as the US Department of Defense
(with the possibilities of creating managerial
and technological skills that become dissemi-
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nated and are used for new projects) and the
creation of parallel venture capital and intellec-
tual property defence markets have all been de-
cisive as well.
Conversely, taking the example of Catalonia, the
existence of first-class knowledge centres such as
the National Microelectronics Centre of the CSIC
in Bellaterra (one of the most important white
rooms in Southern Europe) or the international
corporate development centre for large plotters at
Hewlett Packard in Sant Cugat (a big generator of
patents) has not brought about the development
of substantial auxiliary technological infrastruc-
ture. The main reason is that they did not cluster,
they did not create a local innovation system. This
is probably a big challenge for setting out future
public policies: creating systems around the big
knowledge centres.
Competitive success of a company
depends on the strategy chosen –
which will need to focus on achieving
and maintaining differentiating
elements – and the setting in which
the company competes.
The systemic view on innovation and its merger
with Porter’s studies extends the innovation con-
cept far beyond technology and places it amidst
strategic business thought (as has already been
said, Michael Porter is the father of the school of
strategic positioning at Harvard), which makes
Michael Porter the economist whose works have
been used in a most prolific and pragmatic way
as to both individual business strategy and set-
ting out public competitiveness policies all over
the world.
According to Porter, at the end of the day, com-
petitive success of a company depends on two
variables: the strategy chosen (as has been said
for developed countries, this strategy will need to
focus on achieving and maintaining differentiat-
ing elements, that is, it will need to be based on
the capacity to innovate) and the setting in which
the company competes (the ecosystem or cluster
fertilising or hampering innovative activity).
The need for enlarging
the concept: innovation
according to the Oslo
Manual
The linear view on innovation and specifically
technological innovation as a process in which
someone does research and someone else makes
business with the results as well as the immedi-
ate association of a country’s development index
to its aggregated R&D expenditure is lastly over-
come with the new systemic view on innovation.
Moreover, there is a set of considerable weak
points in conventional thought on technological
innovation that require new definitions of inno-
vation, reaching far beyond research and techno-
logical development:
 Although technological innovation activities
are relatively easy to measure (basic research
costs, R&D subcontracting costs, investment in
fixed assets, prototype costs, samples, approvals
and tests, etc.), these are input, not output indica-
tors. Just as it is unthinkable to measure the com-
petitive capacity of an industrial company based
on its raw material consumption, it is also wrong
to anticipate the success of a company based on
its R&D investment. In the knowledge economy,
knowledge is a raw material but it has to be
transformed into market value.
 Likewise, the indicators for patents, again re-
lated to the degree of a company’s or country’s
technological innovation, are intermediate indi-
cators. It is not relevant how many patents a
company or a country has but the value it is able
to gain from it in terms of turnover following
patented inventions or the licenses obtained
from these patents, which is much more difficult
to measure.
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 It is also clear that there is a strong correlation
between a country’s degree of development and
its indicators for technological innovation, for in-
stance, in terms of R&D investment on GDP.
What is not clear is the cause-effect relation. In
other words, is the country rich because its com-
panies are R&D-intensive or is the country able
to allocate public resources to funding research
and are its companies R&D-intensive because
they have been successful on their markets and
have achieved a size that allows them to allocate
considerable resources to research and techno-
logical development?
There is a correlation between a
country’s degree of development and
its indicators for technological
innovation, although the cause-effect
relation is not clear.
Finally, the same indicators for technological in-
novation, taken as indicators for economic devel-
opment par excellence, are perverse in their con-
ception and exclude growth and wealth factors
based on other innovation types. Thus, a country
could in theory be more innovative, for instance,
by destroying GDP based on logistics or manu-
facturing (causing the ratio of R&D investment
on GDP to raise). Paradoxically, if a successful in-
ternational giant as the likes of Ikea, Dell, Star-
bucks, Benetton or McDonald’s came up in Cat-
alonia, we would be a less innovating country as
these companies base their differentiation strate-
gy on logistic, service, process or organisational
and not strictly technological innovation, by
which the country’s R&D investment would not
increase substantially but its GDP would, thus
causing a decrease of those innovation indicators
typically held to be meritorious.
At both microeconomic (understanding the inno-
vation process from a business management per-
spective) and macroeconomic level (creating indi-
cators for innovative activity that explain better
regional and national economic growth), innova-
tion needs therefore to be interpreted from a much
wider angle than the strictly technological view.
The concept of innovation differs from
that of improvement in the degree of
risk the former bears.
The Oslo Manual published by the OCDE is an
international landmark in defining and interpret-
ing the innovation process as well as probably the
most relevant source of guidelines for collecting
and analysing data on innovative activity in order
to obtain comparable indicators offering an inter-
national perspective. In its latest update from late
2005 it provides explicitly for non-technological
innovation processes and points out the immi-
nent need for also measuring those innovation
factors not directly related to R&D. According to
this manual, innovation «is the implementation
of a new product (good or service) or process or
one with a high degree of improvement, or a new
organisation or sales method applied to business
practices, the working place or external rela-
tions».
The innovation types described in the Oslo Man-
ual are the following:
1. Process innovation
It generally stands for the application of knowl-
edge or technology to the production or distribu-
tion process, thus creating economies in the value
chain. It is about doing the same in a more effi-
cient way, thus becoming a clearly defensive in-
novation type.
Productive process innovation is a way of inno-
vating that is deeply rooted in our managerial
mindset. This is basically due to the fact of being
intricately related to management methodologies
that were predominant in the Catalan manufac-
turing industry, expanded vertically across the
whole value chain (often because the customer
required it) and spread horizontally to other value
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chains starting basically with the car industry.
Such management methodologies come from
Japanese kaizen («improvement for change»), are
based on incremental improvement, continuous
improvement as a method of personal progress
and business management tool, leading to the set
of instruments known as Total Quality Manage-
ment (TQM), which is after all a sort of incre-
mental innovation.
Total quality, fully turned towards
incremental innovation, is nothing else
than a subset of a basically defensive
mentality within innovation
management that tends towards
avoiding risk.
TQM thus generates innovation through evolu-
tion (never revolution) tending towards process
standardisation, zero fault, absolute perfection of
existing technologies and processes as well as the
implementation of control systems that anticipate
and avoid production faults. Total quality, fully
turned towards incremental innovation, is noth-
ing else than a subset of a basically defensive
mentality within innovation management that
tends towards avoiding risk.
However, the classic way of applying technologi-
cal innovation to the production process is process
automation. Robotising a production line and in-
corporating electronic measuring and control sys-
tems is the usual kind of innovation initiative our
industry demands. But here we are again in a
clearly defensive innovation type that shuns risk.
Acquiring several industrial robots and placing
them in a production chain is, albeit a certainly
considerable financial effort for a company, a
low-grade innovation process due to the follow-
ing reasons:
 It means acquiring technology that is freely
available on the market, state of the art, yet vul-
garised technology. It does not provide for any
true competitive advantage since any competitor
can also acquire it.
 It is a project in which the technology is
proven. It may represent an engineering effort
but success is guaranteed, and so is the return on
investment. Since there is no uncertainty (should
the investment be a failure, then it is due to a
managerial error, not the technological risk of
the project) and since no real competitive advan-
tage is generated, the project should not be given
priority when allocating public funds for innova-
tion.
In traditionally manufacturing industries as the
textile branch, there has been recently occurring a
concentration of margins on distribution chan-
nels. This sectorial trend, typical of segments
characterised by big consumption, has led to a
new successful strategy: the control over the dis-
tribution channel and, in a wider perspective, in-
novation in distribution processes. Many compa-
nies in these industries have started focusing
their differentiation efforts on this part of the val-
ue chain. Those staying in direct contact with the
customer win.
As a consequence, there are in Catalonia over a
hundred fast growing (often double-digit or more)
textile companies that achieved this target by spe-
cialising in certain market segments, fast logistics,
the creation of own brands and the control over
the distribution channel. Mango (with over two
hundred engineers at the Palau de Plegamans site
improving the company’s logistic algorithms), De-
sigual and Sita Murt are some examples.
At international level, the classic success story in
a mature industry based on innovation in distri-
bution is Zara, a company that presents its value
proposal (differentiation strategy) in its capacity
of pushing new clothing collections every two
weeks so its logistic apparatus reacts immediately
to the market trends. It is said that Zara flooded
the market with black two weeks after 9/11 while
the fashion colours of the season were then much
livelier.
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Companies such as Dell (online PC distribution),
Ikea (coproduction of furniture with the cus-
tomer) and Amazon (the world’s largest virtual
bookshop that transformed the typically medieval
business of selling books and propelled it into the
21st century through online and interactive mar-
keting) are further success stories that are already
part of innovation history.
2. Product innovation  
It stands for the generation and introduction into
the market of a new or significantly improved
product. The introduction of a new product is an
aggressive type of innovation. Having own prod-
ucts means not to be part of the value chain
(subcontractor, manufacturer, distributor) but to
really dominate the business and deciding the
fate of one’s own business. Many Catalan sub-
contractors of car manufacturers – that came up
as small garages or electrical and electronic engi-
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neering companies to support foreign manufac-
turing plants or as specialised suppliers of metal
and plastic pieces – have developed outstanding
managerial and technological capacities. These
companies have first-class technical departments
that unfortunately have seldom thought of
searching an exclusive market niche independent
from the orders of their traditional customers
and becoming true international manufacturers
and exporters of their own products.
The local managers of Tecniacero, a plastic injec-
tion factory within the Raymond group, or the
owners and managers of Vilardell Purtí, a Cata-
lan precision machining company, are typical ex-
amples of innovative nonconformism and obses-
sion for creating own production lines – as is the
case of RayGreen (biodegradable plastics for the
agrofood industry) and Avinent (tooth implants
for the health industry) – that have allowed them
to escape the decadent evolution of their source
industries.
ZARA (Inditex) is a classic success story in a mature industry based on innovation. The walkman
by Sony was a legendary innovation in history.
The generation of new products offers great cre-
ative opportunities. It allows to develop true blue
oceans2 in the words of the professors at the
French business school INSEAD, Kim and
Mauborgne – blue oceans, free of the blood of
competitors, new, pristine, virgin value spaces.
This is the case, for instance, of Actimel, a prod-
uct developed by Danone that creates a new val-
ue space halfway between nutrition and health, a
nutritional product with beneficial properties for
the digestive apparatus that can be sold both as a
mass consumption good in department stores
and in pharmacies by medical recommendation.
Other examples of new value spaces, new and
original combinations of product and market
being at the same time success episodes in in-
novation history, are the walkman by Sony (no-
body demanded it, nobody had even imagined
it, but Sony identified a clear opportunity of
generating a new product and a new market by
combining the passion for music with the possi-
bility of listening to it while walking), the arrival
of the MPVs in Europe with the first Renault Es-
pace and the introduction of snowboards to ride
the slopes of the Alps with the same spirit as
the surfers in Hawaii. Finally, if the motor car
was the machine that changed the world,3 then
the e-mail (to speak not of a physical product
but a new service) has been the tool that
sparked a revolution in our working and com-
munication pattern.
The introduction of a new product
is an aggressive type of innovation.
The magic of innovation is that the economy is not
a zero-sum game. On the contrary, infinite new
value spaces can be created, as many as our imagi-
nation allows and as many as there are human
needs to be satisfied. Whole new industries can be
developed upon them. Technology adds a new di-
mension to the development of the product. If
classic economics state that the production factors
(basically capital and work) are finite by definition,
for the first time in history now appears a new
production factor that turns out to be infinite:
knowledge. Pragmatic knowledge, technology, ap-
plied to solving infinite problems and needs of hu-
mans, becomes an utmost powerful driver for cre-
ating new products and markets, even more if we
consider that the existing scientific knowledge in
the world doubles every five years.
But again, we must not forget the great contribu-
tions of non-technological innovation. Few prod-
ucts have had the same impact on society as, for
instance, newspapers (the appearance of com-
mercial press) or insurances.
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Actimel, a product developed by Danone, creates a new value space halfway between nutrition and
health. Dell is another success story that is already part of innovation history.
3. Marketing innovation 
It is the implementation of a new business
method that brings about significant change in
the product design (driven by aesthetics, func-
tionality or ergonomics) or in its promotion, dis-
tribution and pricing policies.
Design, which in the new version of the Oslo
Manual is restricted to marketing innovation, is
probably the most human aspect of innovation –
the product ergonomics, functionality and aes-
thetics yield doubtless competitive advantages.
When buying a new car, its design and appear-
ance are often decisive. If I want to acquire a
thermostat to regulate the temperature at home,
I probably will take the nicest one, even if its sen-
sitivity in tenths of degrees is lower.
Any product has a structural,
constituent design as well as a
differentiated design as to the
properties defining efficiency when
interacting with the consumer.
However, design has not only to do with aesthet-
ics. Any product has a structural, constituent de-
sign as well as a differentiated design as to the
properties defining efficiency when interacting
with the consumer. For instance, the sheer ineffi-
ciency of most remote controls of consumer elec-
tronic devices is notorious. A DVD player comes
with an often unintelligible one-hundred-side
user guide. Brands like Samsung and Panasonic
are making now great efforts to incorporate a dif-
ferentiated design in its products that optimises
the relationship with the consumer, starting re-
search and innovation lines aimed at analysing
the user behaviour in a real setting, a sort of 21st
century consumer anthropology.
Innovation in the way of communicating a prod-
uct or in the very set of values the product bears
is often a vast source of wealth. To put an exam-
ple, eyeglass manufacturers discovered recently
that glasses can be bought not only for the sake
of optical correction but also as a fashion item,
even without any therapeutic aim. Montblanc
smartly managed to position itself as a luxury ar-
ticle brand in spite of manufacturing pens (no-
body would buy a pen for six hundred euros for
its primary use but they would as a luxury gift to
a beloved person) and Benetton breaks traditional
marketing rules by launching an aggressive cam-
paign in which the product (clothes) is not adver-
tised, as the classic business paradigm would
suggest, but featuring controversial pictures of
terminal AIDS patients and a newborn baby full
of blood and still attached to the umbilical chord,
thus looking for sheer impact and brand notori-
ety.
4. Organisational innovation 
It is the implementation of a new organisational
method applied to business practices at the work-
ing place or in external business relations.
The true breaking innovations in such a competi-
tive and R&D-intensive branch as the car indus-
try have been paradoxically of organisational na-
ture: the linear assembly line by Henry Ford in
the early 20th century that allowed car mass
manufacture at a low cost for the US middle class
(it is said that it came to democratise the indus-
try) and Japanese just in time from the mid-20th
century that allowed a country so short in com-
petitive advantages as Japan to gain a consider-
able share of the world car market thanks to or-
ganisational capacity by service à la carte and
extreme stock reductions through synchronising
their assembly line with those of the providers.
The Oslo Manual avoids referring to the use of
technological innovation since it feels that the
word technological restricts considerably the scope
of what is known as innovation. In fact, according
to Drucker, management itself (and also innova-
tion as part of management) is a social technology.
And all organisations have by definition technolo-
gy (pragmatic knowledge) they incorporate into
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the product, the production and trade process
and the organisational architecture to create value
for a certain market.
Nevertheless, in spite of making a significant step
towards enlarging the concept, the definition of
innovation is still extremely ambiguous. What
does significant improvement mean? And what ef-
fect may this ambiguity have on public policies?
The solution is reasonably simple: the concept of
innovation differs from that of improvement in
the degree of risk the former bears. Improving is do-
ing the same as before but with resource econo-
my. For instance, installing LEDs in parking hous-
es to tell if there is a car or not is not an
innovation but an improvement since the owner
acquires common technology on the market with-
out taking any risk. It is a simple engineering, not
a technological innovation project. And this is the
real clue that shall define the object of public aid
as far as it exists: to cover business risk in order to
take on projects that could be of high social inter-
est (due to their economic impact or their capacity
to disseminate generated abilities) but difficult to
tackle due to their degree of uncertainty and risk.
This is covering market failures.
Towards multidimensional
innovation: the car industry
Let us have a look at the car branch, without any
doubt the most competitive and R&D-intensive
industry of the world and a great generator of
management methods and best practices that
have been exported to other industries. If we look
at the profitability of the different car brands, es-
pecially the return on investment for their share-
holders, we will see that there are two groups of
car manufacturers clearly leading the race for
competitiveness: 4
Those creating value for the shareholder by
means of a combination of attributes related to
brand, quality, technology and design, such as the
German brands from the Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg cluster: Mercedes, Porsche and
BMW. They are characterised by transmitting the
strong emotional values of an exclusive sports
and luxury brand at a high selling cost and in
general also high production costs.
Those creating value for the shareholder by
means of a strategy with high operative efficiency,
with organisational and process innovations that
allow to keep production costs low and offer cars
with good value for money. A good example are
the brands from the Japanese car cluster such as
Honda and Toyota.
Technology (understood as R&D
investment) is necessary but not
enough anymore. It is indispensable
to compete, though not a guarantee
for success.
Other brands are by and large out of the game of
perceived differentiating attributes and find them-
selves often in difficult financial situations, espe-
cially due to the low appeal of their shares related
to other stock offering a higher profitability at the
same risk. Some are even steadily losing money in
their manufacturing and distribution operations,
being only able to make up for it through their fi-
nancial services when selling cars. These manufac-
turers wage a fierce price war among themselves,
thus eroding margins and leading to progressive
strangling of their supplier networks. They have
no strategic differentiation factors.
The gap between R&D investment, the degree of
innovation and market success turns apparent
with all its cruelty in this industry: four of the ten
most research-intensive companies of the world
are car manufacturers (Ford, General Motors,
Daimler-Chrysler and Toyota)5 but three of them
(the former) are destroying value for their share-
holders and find themselves in a deep strategic
crisis that threatens their very survival while only
one (Toyota) ranks worldwide at the top of inno-
vative companies6 and has systematically been
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making progress in its overall turnover and prof-
itability since the 1950s. Thus, paradoxically, the
most R&D-intensive companies such as Ford,
General Motors and Daimler-Chrysler are in fact
losing the war of profitability in the industry and
need to take drastic saving measures.7
The technological flow needs to be
followed at the same pace as it is
generated so we are not expelled from
the market. Innovation as a strategic
differentiation factor has now entered
other spheres.
The shares of Ford, the most R&D-intensive com-
pany in the world, are now less worth than twenty
years ago and the company is thinking of selling
its premium subsidiaries (Jaguar and Land Rover)
to act on its severe financial crisis. General Motors
suffered a 6% sales reduction in 2007 and Daim-
ler, the company doing most R&D in Europe, re-
cently sold Chrysler to a venture capital fund. By
contrast, Toyota recently replaced General Motors,
the traditional giant in the industry, as the manu-
facturer with the highest turnover, basically
thanks to its continuous improvement capacity.
Opportunities lie therefore often in other, not
strictly technological but organisational (logistic
integration, cooperative development with sup-
pliers, concurrent engineering) or marketing fac-
tors (creation of new market segments, sports de-
sign, creating emotions associated to the brand).
The buying decision is becoming more and more
emotional instead of rational.
However, there is more to it: if R&D investment
(i.e. technological innovation) is not a key to
competitive success without a differentiated
strategic positioning, then technology itself becomes
a hygienic, not a strategic factor. Who takes the de-
cision of buying a car looking specifically at the
engine technology or GPS? On the contrary,
without the latest combustion technology, state of
the art ABS brakes or electronic traction control,
the car would probably not sell. If it does, it is
generally not thanks to the latest technological
features but the factor determining the buying
decision (strategic factors for the manufacturer) is
usually the combination of brand and design or
value for money, two competitive factors related
to the two aforementioned groups of manufactur-
ers. Technology (understood as R&D investment)
is necessary but not enough anymore. It is indis-
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The German brands, Mercedes, Porsche and
BMW, are creating value for the shareholder by
means of a combination of attributes related to
brand, quality, technology and design
pensable to compete, though not a guarantee for
success. The technological flow needs to be fol-
lowed at the same pace as it is generated so we
are not expelled from the market. It is just good
for having the cards to play the game but not
good enough for winning it. Innovation as a
strategic differentiation factor has now entered
other spheres.
Conclusions
Innovation is a process the goal of which is to
have strategic differentiation elements for the
company. It is therefore about strategic organisa-
tion management. Whenever these differentiat-
ing elements are based on technology we speak
of technological innovation, which is especially im-
portant as it creates strong barriers for the com-
petition to enter. However, the linear view of
technological innovation (generation of knowl-
edge, its wrapping into a product or process and
later sale) does not explain cases of competitive
success based on other innovations types, re-
stricts the key to development of countries and
regions to their R&D potential and comes up
with one-sided and controversial indicators.
A new interpretation of the process from a sys-
temic perspective and its holistic view (enlarging
it to marketing and organisation) has made clear
the need for new definitions of innovation and
measuring patterns as those featured in the new
edition of the Oslo Manual that sets an end to
the classic linear conception of innovation as a
thoroughly technological process and progresses
firmly towards the creation of a systemic model
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